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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This report examines the distinct mechanisms of direct democracy practiced in various 
foreign countries. The discussion will begin with a brief definition of direct democracy followed 
by the terminology used to describe the various mechanisms. After setting forth a definitional 
framework for the discussion, the report will focus on the electoral initiative and referendum as 
practiced in Switzerland, the Philippines, Kenya, and Australia, with an emphasis on comparison 
to the California model. Finally, this report will provide recommendations for improving the 
California initiative system by adopting mechanisms employed by the countries surveyed in this 
report.  
 
A. Direct Democracy 
 
In order to properly examine and compare the direct democracy mechanisms in different 
countries, it is important to begin with a threshold question: what is direct democracy? Direct 
democracy is a system of governance in which citizens make decisions regarding laws and 
policies through direct votes rather than delegate the decision-making process solely to elected 
representatives.1  
 
In practice, the direct democracy mechanisms which increase citizen involvement in 
policy decisions are mandated “by the constitution or by individual governments through 
legislation and through the choice and design of the electoral system.”2 As such, the mechanisms 
of direct democracy vary from country to country. However, this report will focus on two 
distinct mechanisms: initiative and referendum.3  
 
B. Definitions: Initiatives and Referendums 
 
The initiative and referendum are two distinct mechanisms of direct democracy, and the 
terminology used to describe these mechanisms may also vary between countries.  In addition, 
there are various forms of initiatives and referendums. Thus, for the purposes of this report, the 
definitions of certain forms of initiatives and referendums are provided below: 
Table 1.1 Forms of Initiatives 
Initiative (Citizen’s Initiative)4 
• A mechanism of direct democracy by which voters suggest a new statute or 
constitutional amendment by gathering signatures to demand a popular vote 
• Can be operated Directly or Indirectly 
                                                 
1 See INT’L  INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE 
INTERNATIONAL IDEA HANDBOOK 19 (2008), 
http://www.idea.int/publications/direct_democracy/upload/DDH_inlay_low.pdf [“IDEA”]. 
2 Id. at iv. 
3 Please note: this is not an exhaustive study on initiative and referendum mechanisms. As such, the 
power of the recall will not be discussed in this report. 
4 Initiative, Referendum and Recall, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS., http://www.ncsl.org/research/ elections-
and-campaigns/initiative-referendum-and-recall-overview.aspx (last visited September 13, 2014).   
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Direct Initiative5 Agenda (Indirect) Initiative6  
• Citizen proposals are placed directly 
onto the ballot and decided by voters 
• Citizen proposals are first considered 
by the legislature 
• May receive a popular vote later in 
some systems 
 
Table 1.2 Forms of Referendums 
Referendum7 
 
• A direct democracy procedure that gives the electorate a direct vote on a specific 
political, constitutional or legislative issue.  
Forms of Referendums Definitions 
Mandatory Referendum8 A direct democracy procedure that is required 
for certain government actions; often for 
constitutional amendments suggested by the 
legislature; used for bond acts in California. 
Optional Referendum (Popular Veto)9  A direct democracy procedure in which the 
electorate demands a popular vote on a piece 
of legislation. 
Advisory Referendum (Plebiscites)10  A direct democracy procedure in which the 
legislature initiates a nonbinding popular vote 
on an issue of public policy. 
 
The scope of this report is limited to the terminology and the definitions provided in Tables 1.1 
and 1.2.    
 
II. CALIFORNIA’S DIRECT DEMOCRACY SYSTEM 
 
California’s use of direct democracy dates back to 1911, when progressive Governor 
Hiram Johnson persuaded the legislature to adopt a system of statewide initiatives and 
referendums.11  This report will examine three particular forms of direct democracy practiced in 
California. The initiative process allows citizens to propose statutes or constitutional 
                                                 
5 Direct Democracy: Referendums, THE ELECTORAL KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, http://aceproject.org/ace-
en/focus/direct-democracy/citizen-initiatives (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).  
6 Id.  
7 IDEA, supra note 1, at 84. 
8 Direct Democracy: Referendums, THE ELECTORAL KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, http://aceproject.org/ace-
en/focus/direct-democracy/citizen-initiatives (last visited Sept. 14, 2014). 
9 Id.  
10 Types of Referendums, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 
http://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/referendums/types.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
11 California, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, http://iandrinstitute.org/California.htm (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2014).  
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amendments.12 Mandatory referendums are a popular vote held to decide on constitutional 
amendments originating in the legislature.13 The optional referendum endows voters with a veto 
power by which they can reject a law passed by the legislature.14 Though this report will not 
discuss it, California also uses a system of legislatively referred acts, whereby certain types of 
statutes that originate in the legislature must be passed by a popular vote in order to become law. 
Any statute that incurs a public debt of $300,000 or greater must be approved in this manner.15 
Most commonly, this method is used to pass water and school bonds, including Proposition 1 on 
the November 2014 ballot.16 Californians also have the power to recall state officials, as 
evidenced by the recall of Governor Gray Davis in 2003.17 These methods of direct democracy 
exist for the limited purposes of restricting the legislature’s ability to accrue debts and allowing 
voters to remove state officials. Because this report focusses on methods of enacting policy 
through law creation, it will not discuss legislatively referred acts or recall elections 
 
A. Legal Framework 
 
The Constitution of California sets forth the steps involved in the initiative process. First, 
proponents of an initiative must submit the measure’s text to the California Attorney General, 
who will give the initiative an official name and summary.18 Second, proponents must circulate a 
petition requesting that the initiative appear on the statewide ballot. The number of signatures 
required to qualify an initiative is based upon the number of votes cast in the last gubernatorial 
election: ballot measures that initiate constitutional amendments require eight percent of the most 
recent gubernatorial election, whereas initiative statutes or veto referendums require only five 
percent.19 Finally, if an initiative qualifies for the ballot, it will pass with a simple majority of 
votes.20  
 
Moreover, initiatives may not “embrac[e] more than one subject,” and courts are willing 
to invalidate initiatives that violate this rule.21 However, the California Supreme Court has 
consistently interpreted the single-subject rule to allow a multi-part initiative, so long as its 
provisions are “reasonably germane to a single theme or purpose.”22 Consequently, extensive 
statutory schemes have become law through the initiative process, including the Victims’ Bill of 
                                                 
12 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8.  
13 Id. art. XVIII, § 4. 
14 Id. art. II, § 9.  
15 Id. art. XVI, § 1. 
16Sean Creadick & Patrick Lewis, Proposition 1: Water Quality, Supply, and Infrastructure Improvement 
Act of 2014, CAL. INIT. REV., (Fall 2014).  
17 CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 13–19.   
18 Id. art. II, § 10(d).  
19 Id. art. II, § 8(b).   
20 Id. art. II, § 10(a).  
21 Id. art. II, § 8(d); Senate of State of Cal. v. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th 1142, 1168–1169, 988 P.2d 1089, 1105–
1106 (1999) (invalidating an initiative which affected electoral redistricting and the salaries of 
legislators).  
22 Senate of State of Cal., 21 Cal. 4th at 1163.   
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Rights in 1982 (Prop 8) and the Political Reform Act of 1974 (Prop 9).23 Critics have questioned 
the value of allowing such large bodies of law to become effective through a popular vote.24 
  
B. Criticism of California’s Initiative Process 
 
California’s initiative process has been subject to intense criticism. For example, critics 
argue that it is too easy to amend the California constitution since only a simple majority of votes 
is required to pass an amendment.25 Because of this low threshold, commentators claim that the 
California constitution has become a “bloated mishmash.”26  
 
Another area of concern is the sheer number of initiatives on the ballot.27 A large number 
of initiatives can lead to voter fatigue, which affects a measure’s outcome based on its position 
on the ballot.28 Similarly, commentators worry that voters who are not well educated about the 
content of initiatives are largely casting votes based on the content of paid advertising and 
limited news coverage.29 This is attributable to the fact that many initiatives are complex and 
difficult to comprehend. One study found that seventy-eight percent of voters believe that “some 
or only a few of the propositions are understandable to most voters.”30 
  
Critics also point to consistently low voter turnout as a major weakness of California’s 
direct democracy system.31 Initiatives and referendums are intended to represent the will of the 
voting public, but this purpose is subverted when only a small percentage of voter actually 
participate.32 Turnout in the June 2014 primary election was only twenty-five percent, and two 
ballot initiatives were passed.33 Arguably, these measures did not receive a strong mandate from 
the state’s voters when so few of them actually voted.  
 
Perhaps most disconcerting to critics is the significant role that money plays in the 
initiative process.34 Statistically, the outcome of an initiative campaign is often correlated with 
                                                 
23 California Crime Victims’ Rights, CAL. VICTIM COMPENSATION PROGRAM, 
http://vcgcb.ca.gov/victims/rights.aspx (last visited Sept. 13, 2014); Political Reform Division, CAL. 
SECRETARY ST., http://www.sos.ca.gov/prd/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2014).  
24 Op-Ed Edward L. Lascher et al., It’s Too Easy to Amend California’s Constitution, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 
2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/04/opinion/oe-hodson4. 
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Jessica Levinson, Ballot Initiatives Have Harmed California, KCET (Jan. 23, 2012, 10:15 AM), 
http://www.kcet.org/ updaily/socal_focus/commentary/would-you-like-to-save-california.html.  
28 CHARLENE WEAR SIMMONS, CALIFORNIA’S STATEWIDE INITIATIVE PROCESS 11 (California State 
Library 1997) available at https://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/06/97006.pdf.  
29 Id. 
30 Id.  
31 LEDUC, supra note 31, at 151. 
32 Id.  
33 Press Release, Cal. Sec’y of State, June Primary Results Certified, Showing Record-Low Turnout and 
Record-High Vote-by-Mail Rate (July 11, 2014), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/admin/press-
releases/2014/db14-057.htm.  
34 See generally DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF 
MONEY (2000) (detailing the significant influence of special interests upon the initiative process).  
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the amount of money spent by the measure’s proponents and opponents.35 In particular, a well-
funded opposition can severely limit a proposition’s chances of passing.36 This inevitably drives 
up the cost of a successful campaign in support of a ballot initiative.  For instance, even before 
an initiative campaign truly begins, the expense of gathering hundreds of thousands of signatures 
sets a high price of admission for citizens who want to propose an initiative. One study found 
that during the 2012 election, the cost of gathering signatures ranged from $584,126 to 
$8,773,490.37 From the outset, this cost limits the use of the “citizens’ initiative” to well-funded 
interests. Despite the criticisms leveled against California’s initiative process, it continues to be 
popular with voters.38 
 
III. INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM MECHANISMS: A GLOBAL 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 
 
This section of the report provides a global comparative study of selected countries with 
an aim towards proposing solutions to improve California’s initiative and referendum system. 
This comparative study focuses on Switzerland, the Philippines, Kenya, and Australia, 
respectively. While there are numerous other countries that authorize direct democracy 
mechanisms, these countries provide a diverse cross section of how direct democracy 
mechanisms can be used to engage citizens.39  
  
A. Direct Democracy in Switzerland 
 
1. Legal Framework 
 
The Swiss constitution established four separate mechanisms of direct democracy: 
(1) mandatory referendums, where the Swiss parliament seeks permission from the voters to 
amend the constitution; (2) initiative constitutional amendment referendums, where the voters 
request that a change be made to the constitution; (3) optional referendums, where the voters 
decide on a piece of legislation passed by the parliament; and (4) referendums, where the voters 
decide whether to ratify an international treaty.40 Swiss citizens regularly participate in their 
                                                 
35 SIMMONS, supra note 28, at 12.  
36 Id.  
37 2012 Ballot Measure Petition Signature Costs, California, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/2012_ballot_measure_petition_signature_costs#California (last visited Sept. 13, 
2014).  
38 PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS–HOW DEMOCRATIC IS IT? 2, 
available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/op/OP_202XXOP.pdf. A study in 2000 found that seventy 
percent of voters approved of the initiative process, with fifty-six percent believing that it is a better way 
of making policy decisions than is using the legislature.   
39 This report is not an exhaustive study, but rather highlights four countries that have mechanisms of 
direct democracy that encompass the initiative and referendum systems as defined in Section I of this 
report. See supra Table 1.1 and 1.2. 
40 BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 138–42. This paper will focus 
on the first three types of referendums because they have the most relevance to the system of initiatives 
and referendums that exists in California.  
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nation’s system of direct democracy. Elections take place between two and four times every 
year, with a small number of referendums appearing on the ballot in every election.41 
 
Under the Swiss constitution, all constitutional amendments must be approved by a 
popular vote.42 An amendment will only take effect if it is approved with a double majority.43 A 
double majority requires that a simple majority of all Swiss voters approve the amendment, as 
well as a majority of voters in a majority of the Swiss states (called cantons).44 This requirement 
makes it more difficult for constitutional amendments to become law, and it allows the small 
states to place a check on the power of the large states.45  
 
2. The Agenda Initiative and Referendum Process 
 
The Swiss utilize an agenda initiative system, also known as indirect initiative.46 Citizens 
must collect 100,000 signatures to qualify a constitutional amendment for the ballot.47 Voter 
initiatives come immediately before the legislative body instead of going directly onto the ballot, 
and parliament reviews the amendment to ensure that it complies with the law.48 If the 
amendment is defective, it will be disqualified. Otherwise, the legislature may either accept it 
and pass it into law or propose an alternative amendment to appear alongside the voter-initiated 
amendment on the ballot.49 After parliament has acted on the amendment, proponents can 
abandon the amendment if they are satisfied with parliament’s response or continue to advocate 
for the measure if they disagree with parliament.50 Parliament opposes most constitutional 
amendments that originate from the voters. Nevertheless, commentators estimate that about forty 
percent of all voter-initiated constitutional amendments result in some type of change to the law, 
which is often made through a compromise on the part of the legislature.51 In this sense, the 
Swiss parliament is officially involved in the referendum process.  
 
                                                 
41 LEDUC, supra note 31, at 154–58.  
42 BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 140, para. 1(a).  
43 Id. at art. 142, para. 1–4.  
44 Id.  
45 RENÉ SCHWOK, SWITZERLAND – EUROPEAN UNION: AN IMPOSSIBLE MEMBERSHIP? 105 (2006), 
available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=L8HZoBv4_MAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=inauthor:%22Ren%C3%
A9+Schwok%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=-
eIVVIXDAabRiwKsiYCYDQ&ved=0CCgQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false.  
46 PHILIP L. DUBOIS, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS 49–50 (1998), 
available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=Rq18JkGtj6IC&printsec=frontcover&dq=inauthor:%22Philip+L.+Du
bois%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=n9kVVPLDAtbjoASTgYH4Bg&ved=0CB8Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=f
alse. 
47 BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 138, para. 1.  
48 Id. at art. 139, para. 3. 
49 Id. at art. 139, para. 4–5. When a parliamentary counterproposal appears on the ballot, Swiss voters will 
vote on both the initiative amendment and the counterproposal, and they also indicate which measure they 
would prefer, should both measures pass. Id. at art. 139(b), para. 2.  
50 DUBOIS, supra note 46, at 51.  
51 Id. at 52. 
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The Swiss initiative and referendum process is similar, in many respects, to the system in 
California.52 Both California and Switzerland require a popular vote to affirm legislative 
amendments to the constitution, both allow an optional referendum on statutes passed by the 
legislature, and both permit citizens to pass their own constitutional amendments through the 
initiative process.  
 
The systems of direct democracy in Switzerland and California diverge in several ways, 
perhaps most notably in the use of the agenda initiative. In Switzerland, all voter-initiated 
constitutional amendments must go through the parliament before they appear on the ballot. On 
the other hand, California uses only the direct system of initiative wherein measures are placed 
on the ballot without any useful exposure to the legislative branch.53 Although the agenda 
initiative (indirect initiative) process existed in California until 1966, it was abolished that year 
by Proposition 1A.54  
 
B. Direct Democracy in the Philippines 
 
1. Legal Framework 
 
Article XVII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines authorizes 
constitutional amendments or revisions through the initiative process. Article XVII, Section 2, 
states the following: 
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people 
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number 
of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at 
least three per centum of the registered votes therein. No amendment under this 
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this 
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall 
provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.55 
In 1989, the Eighth Congress of the Philippines passed implementing legislation which 
set forth a system of initiative and referendum.  Republic Act No. 6735, titled “The Initiative and 
Referendum Act,” enables the electorate “to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole 
or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body.”56  
 
Section 3 of the Initiative and Referendum Act codifies three distinct forms of direct 
democracy. The direct initiative grants “power . . . [to] the people to propose amendments to the 
                                                 
52 Id. at 49.  
53 See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, Statewide Initiative Guide, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-
measures/initiative-guide.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (describing each step of the California initiative 
process, which does not require the legislature to consider initiatives); see infra Part IV.B.  
54 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: GENERAL ELECTION 
TUESDAY, NOV. 8, 1966, available at http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1966g.pdf. 
Proposition 1A was a legislative constitutional amendment which was submitted to voters through a 
mandatory referendum. Id.   
55  Id.  
56 Rep. Act. No. 6375, § 3. 
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Constitutions or to propose and enact legislation through an election.”57  Under the agenda 
initiative, the electorate sends a proposition to “Congress or the local legislative body for 
action.”58 Finally, the optional referendum empowers “the electorate to approve or reject 
legislation through an election called for that purpose.”59 Thus, the Philippine statutory scheme 
embodies three distinct forms of direct democracy.  
 
2. The Agenda Initiative  
 
Out of the three forms of direct democracy, the agenda initiative is the most divergent 
from California’s system of initiative. This form of direct democracy allows the citizens to 
submit a proposal that will be considered by Congress or the local legislative body for action as 
opposed to a vote by the electorate. California’s initiative system, on the other hand, only permits 
initiatives to be placed directly onto the ballot  
 
3. Signature and Distribution Requirements 
 
In the Philippines, the number of signatures required to invoke the power of initiative or 
referendum takes into consideration the national and local process by imposing signature and 
distribution requirements. For instance, an initiative affecting the 1987 Constitution requires the 
signature of at least 12 percent of registered voters of which “every legislative district must be 
represented by at least 3 percent of the registered voters.”60 However, the percentage of 
registered voters is reduced by two percentage points when the initiative or referendum is 
affecting a law, ordinance, or resolution passed by a legislative assembly of an autonomous 
region, province, municipality, or city. In that case, the requirement is 10 percent of registered 
voters “of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3 percent of the 
registered voters.”61 But, “if the city or province is composed of only one legislative district, then 
at least each municipality in a province or each barangay62 in a city should be represented by at 
least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.”63 In a barangay, the signatures of at 
the least 10 percent of registered voters is required.64 Conversely, in California, the signature 
requirement is based upon the number of votes cast during the most recent gubernatorial election 
which must be equal to 8 percent of the votes cast.65 A statute or veto referendum only requires 5 
percent of the votes cast.66 
 
                                                 
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 Id. § 3. 
60 Id. § 5(b). 
61 Id. § 5(d). 
62 “A unit of administration in Philippine Society consisting of from 50 to 100 families under a headman.” 
Barangay Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/barangay (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2014).  
63 Rep. Act. No. 6375, § 5(d). 
64 Id. § 5(f). 
65 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b). 
66 Id.  
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Furthermore, the local initiative system imposes a minimum signature requirement that is 
different for each of the local government units.67 Autonomous regions require the signatures of 
two thousand registered voters; provinces and cities require the signatures of one thousand 
registered voters; municipalities require the signatures of one hundred registered voters; and 
barangays require the signatures of fifty registered voters.68  
 
In order to make comparisons between the local initiative process in the Philippines and 
the local initiative process in California, it is important to first compare the Philippine local 
system of government to California’s system. The State of California, as a unit of government, is 
most comparable to the provinces69 of the Philippines.70  The provinces are within regions, 
which could be loosely compared to the geographical references used when discussing the 
Midwest or Northeast in the United States.71 On the other hand, autonomous regions are 
comparable to US territories and therefore not relevant for comparison.72  
 
To further compare, within every province there are municipalities and cities.73 The 
municipalities and cities are two distinct units of government.74 A municipality is a corporate 
body acting as a subsidiary of the province within its territorial boundaries, whereas there are 
three classifications of cities.75 The highly urbanized and the independent component cities are 
comparable to the concept of chartered cities76 in California because they function independently 
of the province.77 In contrast, component cities are analogous to general law cities78 in California 
because they are subject to the administrative supervision of the province.79 Lastly, California 
does not have a government unit that is the functional equivalent to a barangay.80  
 
After outlining a few similarities in the local government structures of the Philippines and 
California, there are a few specific comparisons that can be made in regards to the local initiative 
process. For example, the local initiative and referendum system in the Philippines can only be 
                                                 
67 Local government units is a term of art that “refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.” 
Rep. Act. No. 6375, § 3. 
68 Rep. Act. No. 6375, § 13(a). 
69 There are 81 provinces in total. Philippines Has a New Province, LOC. GOV’T ACAD. (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://www.lga.gov.ph/update/philippines-has-new-province.  
70 Id. 
71 Concepts and Definitions: Local Government Units, PHIL. STATS. AUTHORITY (2014), 
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/articles/con_lgu.asp.  
72 Id. 
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 A charter city has supreme authority over municipal affairs which means it overrides a state law 
governing the same topic. LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, CHARTER CITIES: A QUICK SUMMARY FOR THE PRESS 
AND RESEARCHERS, available at http://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Resources-
Section/Charter-Cities/Charter-Cities-A-Quick-Summary-for-the-Press-and-R.  
77 See supra note 71. 
78 See supra note 76. 
79 See supra note 71. 
80 See supra note 62.  
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exercised once a year,81 whereas the California system tracks regularly scheduled elections or a 
special election can be held.82  In California, procedural requirements for local initiatives vary 
among general law cities, charter cities, and counties.83 In general-law cites, proponents “must 
obtain signatures of 10 percent of registered voters for a measure to appear on the ballot in the 
next regularly scheduled election.”84 The requirement is 15 percent if a special election is 
called.85 However, charter cities have a wide latitude in setting their procedures. As such, 
signature requirements range from 5 to 30 percent of registered voters or votes cast in the last 
mayoral election.86 Still, counties require signatures from 10 percent of registered voters or 20 
percent if it is a special election.87 In summary, in California, signature requirements differ for 
local measures and initiatives so there are some similarities here. These similarities demonstrate 
how the initiative process operates on a local level irrespective of the terms used to describe local 
government units.  
 
4. Frequency of Initiatives Amending the Constitution  
 
Along with signature requirements, the Philippine system limits the frequency in which 
citizens can exercise the power of initiative as it relates to the 1987 Constitution of the 
Philippines.88 An initiative on the Constitution can only be exercised once every five years.89 
This is not the case in California. The statutory scheme in California does not regulate the 
frequency where with an initiative may be put forth to amend the constitution.  
 
C. Kenya 
 
1. Legal Framework 
 
Article 257 of the Constitution of Kenya incorporates several forms of direct democracy. 
However, Kenya’s statutory scheme conceptualizes the agenda initiative and referendum system 
on an escalating scale from local government, to the national government, and then to the people. 
For example, Article 257(1) provides that citizens may propose an amendment to the 
Constitution through the initiative process.90 After the Electoral and Boundaries Commission 
reviews the initiative to determine if it satisfies the requirements under Article 257, the 
“Commission submits the draft Bill to each county assembly for consideration within three 
months.”91 If the Bill receives approval from the county assemblies it will be submitted to the 
Speakers of the two houses of Parliament: the Senate and the National Assembly.92 The Bill is 
                                                 
81 Rep. Act. No. 6375, § 15(a). 
82 TRACY M. GORDON, THE LOCAL INITIATIVE IN CALIFORNIA 9–10 (Public Policy Institute of California 
2004), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_904TGR.pdf. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 9. 
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 10. 
87 Id.  
88 Rep. Act. No. 6375, § 5(b). 
89 Id. 
90 CONSTITUTION, art. 257(1) (2010) (Kenya).  
91 Id. art. 257(5). 
92 Id. art. 257(6). 
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passed into law if it is approved by the majority in both houses of Parliament.93 But, “if either 
House of Parliament fails to pass the Bill, . . . the proposed amendment must be submitted to the 
people in a referendum.”94 Twenty percent of registered voters in at least half of the counties 
must vote and a simple majority of citizens must vote in favor of the referendum in order to pass 
the proposed amendment.95 To summarize, the initial stage in the process is illustrative of the 
agenda initiative forms of democracy. In Kenya’s statutory scheme, the mandatory referendum 
ensures that the proposed amendment does not die in the Houses of Parliament.  
 
Table 3.1 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Signature Requirements and Distribution Requirements 
 
Kenya’s signature requirements also differ in comparison to the signature requirements 
under California’s initiative system.  In Kenya, the proposed amendment must be signed by one 
million registered voters, regardless of changes to the population or voter registration.96  With an 
estimated 14.3 million registered voters,97 this is roughly seven percent of the electorate. On the 
other hand, signature requirements in CA are expressed as a percentage of the number of votes 
cast in the most recent gubernatorial election, with five percent required for initiative statutes and 
eight percent required for initiative constitutional amendments.98 This results in a much smaller 
number of signatures being required in California than in Kenya. Since roughly ten million votes 
were cast in the 2010 gubernatorial election, the number of signatures required to qualify 
initiatives in 2014 were 504,760 and 807,615 for statutes and amendments, respectively.99 This is 
much less than Kenya’s flat-rate requirements of one million signatures.100 When viewed as a 
percentage of registered voters, rather than as a percentage of votes cast for governor, 
                                                 
93 Id. art. 257(8). 
94 Id. art. 257(10). 
95 Id. art. 255(2)(1)(a). 
96 Id. art. 257(1). 
97 Voter Register – (Provisional) 2012, DEEP COGITATION BLOG, http://deepcogitation.com/elections-
watch/voter-register-2012/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
98 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b).  
99 State Ballot Initiative Guide , CAL. SECRETARY ST., http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-
measures/how-to-qualify-an-initiative.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).   
100 CONSTITUTION, art. 257(1) (2010) (Kenya). 
Proposed 
Amendment 
County 
Assemblies 
Senate  
National 
Assembly 
Both Houses Pass = 
Law 
 
 
Either House Fails 
to Pass = 
Referendum 
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California’s requirements appear even less demanding. The 504,760 signatures required to 
qualify an initiative statute make up less than three percent of California’s roughly seventeen 
million registered voters.101 This is a stark contrast to the seven percent of all registered voters 
who must sign ballots to qualify an initiative statute in Kenya.102 On the other hand, a flat-rate 
does have the long-term benefit with population growth of possibly becoming a much lower 
threshold.  
 
3. Initiatives and Referendums: Updates and Obstacles 
 
Nevertheless, Kenya may be facing challenges to its system of direct democracy. 
Currently, Amendment Bill 2014 seeks to amend provisions governing the referendum.103 The 
Bill proposes to change the threshold required to pass the proposed amendment from twenty 
percent of registered voters to forty percent.104 Moreover, the Bill will now require a 
participation quorum, in that at east fifty percent of registered voters must cast their votes in the 
referendum.105 Lastly, the Bill will require that referendums be held only during a general 
election of members of parliament.106  
 
D. Direct Democracy in Australia  
 
1. Legal Framework 
  
The Australian constitution authorizes direct democracy for the sole purpose of 
approving constitutional amendments.107 Australian voters do not have the power to suggest 
amendments through the initiative process.108 In the past, Australia has held national, non-
binding advisory referendums, or plebiscites, on controversial matters.109 Certain states in 
Australia continue to use the advisory referendum today.110 Only the legislature may initiate an 
advisory referendum, and the outcome of these referendums influences the government’s 
                                                 
101 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, REGISTRATION BY COUNTY SUPERVISORIAL DISTRICT, available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/60day-general-2014/county.pdf.   
102 Voter Register – (Provisional) 2012, DEEP COGITATION BLOG, http://deepcogitation.com/elections-
watch/voter-register-2012/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
103 Compare Shitemi Khamadi, Analysis of (Amendment Bill) 2014, OLE-SHITEMI, 
http://www.shitemi.com/politics/analysis-of-constitution-amendment-bill-2014/ (last visited September 5, 
2014), with CONST. art. 255(a)(1).   
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
106 Id. 
107 See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 128 (authorizing a popular referendum only on matters of 
constitutional amendment).  
108 Referendums and Plebiscites, PARLIAMENTARY EDUC. OFF., http://www.peo.gov.au/learning/fact-
sheets/referendums-and-plebiscites.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2014).  
109 AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION, supra note 10. 
110 See, e.g., Notice of Plebiscites on Council Amalgamations, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 
http://www.aec.gov.au/elections/referendums/Advisory_Referendums/qld_council_2007/index.htm (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2014) (announcing a plebiscite vote in the state of Queensland).  
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policies.111  Though Australian voters do not have the ability to initiate an advisory referendum, 
it is still an opportunity for them to affect government decision-making. Legislatures are likely to 
follow the results of an advisory referendum because it can appear arrogant to defy the outcome 
of a popular vote.112  
 
2. Voting and the Referendum Process 
  
The Australian referendum system is unique in that voting is mandatory in all 
referendums for citizens over the age of eighteen.113 Any adult who fails to vote in a national 
referendum must present a valid reason for not voting or else pay a small fine.114 Not 
surprisingly, Australia has one of the world’s highest levels of voter turnout, with over ninety-
three percent of voters participating in the 2013 parliamentary election.115  
  
Australian mandatory referendums are also noteworthy because of their relatively low 
rate of passage. Of the forty-four national referendums held to decide constitutional amendments, 
only eight have passed, which is a success rate of roughly eighteen percent.116 One reason for 
this low rate of passage is Australia’s double majority requirement, which operates on the same 
principle as the Swiss model. Any constitutional amendment must receive a simple majority of 
the national vote as well as a majority vote in at least four of Australia’s six states.117  
  
When comparing the systems of direct democracy in Australia and California, the differences 
outnumber the similarities. Australians cannot circulate petitions to create new statutes or make 
constitutional amendments,118 which is the cornerstone of the California model. Further, 
Australians employ the non-binding referendum, a concept relatively unknown to California 
voters.119 Voting is required in Australia and nearly all adults participate in elections. In contrast, 
voting is encouraged in California, but usually less than half of all registered voters cast 
ballots.120 The main similarity between the systems in Australia and California is the use of a 
                                                 
111 AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION, supra note 110.  
112 Id. 
113 Voting Within Australia-Frequently Asked Questions, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 
http://www.aec.gov.au/faqs/voting_australia.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).  
114 Id.  
115 Voter Turnout Data for Australia, INT’L  INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, 
http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=AU (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).  
116 Referendum Dates and Results, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 
http://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/referendums/Referendum_Dates_and_Results.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 
2014). There have been five constitutional amendments which captured a simple majority of the national 
vote, but failed to pass in at least four states. Without the double majority requirement, these amendments 
would have passed, raising the passage rate to over thirty percent.   
117 AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 128.  
118 See id. (including no provisions that authorize popular initiatives).  
119 For a discussion of advisory questions in California, see Brandon Bjerke & Meryl Balalis, 
Legislatively Referred Advisory Questions on the Ballot: The Struggle for Proposition 49 CAL. INIT. 
REV., (Fall 2014). 
120 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, HISTORICAL VOTER REGISTRATION AND PARTICIPATION IN STATEWIDE 
GENERAL ELECTIONS (1910–2012), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2012-general/04-
historical-voter-reg-participation.pdf. 
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mandatory referendum to amend the constitution. However, even this process is notably 
different, with Australia requiring a double majority for amendments to pass.  
 
IV. LESSONS FROM ABROAD 
 
Sections II and III provide a survey of the electoral initiative and referendum mechanisms 
employed by California and select foreign countries. Table 4.1 highlights the various 
mechanisms used by each country. 
 
Table 4.1  
 
Country/State Agenda 
Initiative  
Direct 
Initiative  
Mandatory 
Referendum 
Optional 
Referendum 
Advisory 
Referendum 
California  X X X  
Switzerland X*  X X  
Philippine X X  X  
Kenya X  X   
Australia   X  X 
* The Swiss system only permits constitutional, as opposed to statutory, initiatives.  
 
The foregoing sections suggest that there are as many ways to implement a system of 
direct democracy as there are nations that have such a system. Each of the four nations discussed 
has developed mechanisms to effect citizen participation. Consideration of the forms of direct 
democracy instituted by other countries can inform a discussion on how California could 
improve its own initiative and referendum system. What follows are a few proposals derived 
from Switzerland, the Philippines, Kenya, and Australia that California could adopt to address 
some of the criticisms raised concerning its initiative and referendum system. 
 
A. Signature and Distribution Requirements 
 
In order to blunt the criticism that the low threshold required to pass a constitutional 
amendment results in a constitution that is a “bloated mishmash,”121 implementing a distribution 
requirement may make it more difficult to pass a constitutional amendment. Mirroring the 
Philippines’ system would require a specified percentage of signatures from each county in 
California in order for the initiative to appear on the ballot. This would ensure proportional 
representation, thereby making it more arduous to amend the constitution.122 In addition, 
Kenya’s model, which requires approval from county assemblies, could provide further 
assurance that the measure has support throughout the state. 
                                                 
121 See supra note 20.  
122 For a more in depth treatment of proportional representation, see Initiative Petition Signature 
Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (last updated Sept. 20, 2012), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/signature-requirements.aspx.  
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B. Agenda Initiatives (Indirect Initiatives) 
 
A reintroduction of the agenda initiative could help curb the expense of signature 
gathering in California’s initiative process.123 An often cited disadvantage of California’s 
initiative process is the exorbitant costs to carry an initiative from the signature gathering phase 
to statewide approval.124 Modeled after the Swiss system, the agenda initiative could be a cost-
effective alternative to the direct initiative because it requires fewer signatures. As soon as an 
initiative garners a sufficient number of signatures, the legislature would be required to consider 
the proposal. For some initiatives, this could result in a purely legislative solution, sparing 
proponents the costs of a full-scale campaign. However, if dissatisfied with the legislature’s 
response, the proponents of the initiative would still have the option to take the measure to a 
statewide vote. 
 
In addition, the agenda initiative may result in a more educated electorate.125 
Comparatively, when Swiss voters propose a constitutional amendment through the agenda 
initiative process, the Federal Assembly must formally consider the initiative before it can be 
placed on the ballot. This aspect of the Swiss system can result in a more in-depth conversation 
between the government and the people. When the parliament makes a counterproposal, Swiss 
voters often prefer the parliament’s counterproposal to the original initiative.126 This indicates 
that the agenda initiative process can yield legislative solutions that are satisfactory to Swiss 
voters. Both the increased flexibility of the Swiss initiative process and the wider array of 
proposals from which voters may choose seem to justify the use of the agenda initiative. While 
the California legislature is required to convene “informational hearings” about the propositions 
that will appear on the ballot, these hearings are not widely covered by the media, and thus have 
little effect on the public debate.127 As such, reintroducing the agenda initiative could spur 
dialogue between the legislature and the electorate.  
 
Another feature of the agenda initiative that could also help to increase statewide 
representation of the electorate is demonstrated by the system implemented in Kenya. This 
system incorporates a multi-layered-legislative participation. In other words, county assemblies 
must approve the initiative before it goes to both Houses of Parliament. If this system were 
implemented in California, presumably, the initiative process would require understanding of 
local needs rather than a statewide focus.  
 
Nevertheless, a reintroduction of the agenda initiative could meet political resistance 
because the initiative process has taken on the distinctive character of “California’s fourth branch 
                                                 
123 See supra note 22. 
124 LEDUC, supra note 31, at 150. 
125 See supra note 23. 
126 DUBOIS, supra note. 46, at 51. The Swiss parliament made twenty-six counterproposals to initiative 
constitutional amendments between 1891 and 1991. Of these, Swiss voters adopted seventeen into law. 
Id.   
127 SIMMONS, supra note 28, at 11. 
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of government.”128 The notion of the legislature participating in the initiative process could strike 
voters as a power grab, contravening the original purpose of the initiative as a route around a 
legislative body beholden to special interests.129 Even though any proposal rejected by the 
legislature would necessarily be subjected to a popular vote, voters may be hesitant to include the 
legislature in a method of lawmaking that historically has been the exclusive domain of the 
people.  
  
C. The Double Majority Requirement 
 
The Double Majority Requirement, as exercised in Switzerland and Australia, could also 
help to address the concern that it is too easy to amend the California constitution.130 Under the 
Swiss and Australian constitutions, all amendments must be passed in a national referendum by a 
double majority. This is not the case in California, where a statewide simple majority is 
sufficient to pass legislative and initiative constitutional amendments.  
 
 Implementing the double majority rule in California would require all amendments to be 
passed by a majority of voters in the state, as well as by voters in a majority of California’s 
counties. Again, this would make it more difficult for constitutional amendments to pass. 
Further, in order to pass an amendment, it would have to garner wide support across the state, not 
merely a strong voting base in one region. Thus, the double majority requirement would have the 
dual effect of insulating the constitution from excessive amendments while mandating a more 
widespread consensus on proposed amendments.  
 
 
D. Shorter and More Concise Initiatives 
 
In answer to the criticism that initiatives are difficult to comprehend,131 California could 
mandate that initiatives be shorter and more concise. By comparison, Swiss initiatives are 
usually shorter in length than those that exist in California.132 The primary reason for this 
difference is that the Swiss enforce a strict single-subject rule that applies to all initiatives.133 
Though California has a similar rule, courts have interpreted it to allow large statutory schemes 
to qualify as a single subject.134  
 
To make initiatives more understandable, California could adopt a strict limit on the 
length of ballot initiatives. Though Switzerland does not have any such limitation, the rule would 
bring California’s initiatives more in line with the shorter proposals that appear on Swiss ballots. 
Alternatively, voters could pass an initiative that redefines the single subject rule, making it 
                                                 
128 See CAL. COMM’N ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA’S 
FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 71–74 (1992) (detailing various reasons advanced for using the 
initiative system, the first of which is providing a method for citizens to go around the legislature).  
129 See BRODER, supra note 34, at 21.  
130 See supra note 19. 
131 See supra note 24. 
132 DUBOIS, supra note 46, at 58. 
133 Id. 
134 Senate of State of Cal., 21 Cal. 4th at 1163.  
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much narrower. This could force initiative proponents to focus their proposal on one statute or 
constitutional provision, which would make it much easier for voters to comprehend the effect of 
the initiative by reading its text.  
 
E. Advisory Referendums (Non-binding) 
 
The introduction of a non-binding referendum would allow voters to weigh in on a 
greater number of important issues, while at the same time addressing the concern that there is an 
excessive number of initiatives on the ballot.135 If the legislature were able to call a non-binding 
vote on specific policy matters, it could have the effect of reducing the number of initiative 
campaigns brought by voters. The political cover provided by a popular vote would encourage 
the legislature to address “hot-button issues.”  
 
The advisory referendum could also be adapted to the initiative process, whereby citizens 
could gather signatures to request a statewide advisory vote on a particular issue.136 Since the 
results of such a vote would be non-binding, it would be more acceptable to lower the number of 
signatures required to qualify the measure for the ballot. This would enable citizens to call a vote 
on important policy matters without incurring the full financial burden of gathering the 400,000 
signatures required to qualify a legislative initiative.137 Also, there is no danger of voters passing 
unconstitutional or ambiguous laws. The results of a non-binding initiative would merely serve 
as a mandate to legislators to take action on a particular issue. 
 
Proponents of Proposition 49 in 2014 attempted to call an advisory vote to denounce the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. The California 
Supreme Court removed Proposition 49 from the ballot, holding that, under current law, it is 
unclear whether advisory questions may be the subject of popular initiatives.138 In order for 
advisory referendums to become part of California’s system of direct democracy, voters would 
need to amend the state constitution to explicitly allow for such a vote.  
 
F. Improving Voter Turnout 
 
Low voter turnout is often cited as a concern for the California initiative process.139 
California could improve its initiative process by implementing methods to increase voter 
turnout. An initiative statute, which is supposedly the will of California voters, loses legitimacy 
                                                 
135 See supra note 22. 
136 Proponents of Proposition 49 in 2014 attempted to call an advisory vote to denounce the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. The California Supreme Court rejected 
Proposition 49, holding that, under current law, advisory questions may not be the subject of popular 
initiatives. The report on Proposition 49 contained in this volume details the failure of the proposition.  
137 In the last ten years, there has been a significant rise in the percentage of initiatives that are given 
official titles but fail to qualify for the ballot. This indicates that there are many issues that voters feel are 
important but that failed to reach a statewide vote. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, INITIATIVE TOTALS BY 
SUMMARY YEAR 1912–JANUARY 2013, available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-
measures/pdf/initiative-totals-summary-year.pdf.  
138 Brandon Bjerke & Meryl Balalis, Legislatively Referred Advisory Questions on the Ballot: The 
Struggle for Proposition 49 CAL. INIT. REV., (Fall 2014). 
139 LEDUC, supra note 31, at 151.  
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when it is passed by just a small segment of the state’s voters. For example, the 2014 primary 
election saw only twenty-five percent of California’s registered voters participate.140 This figure 
contrasts sharply with the high rate of turnout in Australia, which has not fallen below ninety 
percent voter turnout since mandatory voting was instituted in 1924.141 Thus, it is arguable that 
referendums in Australia better represent public sentiment since they are decided by a much 
wider segment of voters.  
 
Mandatory voting is not a palatable solution to voter-turnout problems in California or 
any other state in America. However, a more realistic method to increase voter turnout would be 
to set a minimum level of voter participation, or participation quorum, required for a proposition 
to take effect.142  As discussed, Kenya is currently considering the implementation of a quorum 
requirement that would prevent any referendum from taking effect unless fifty percent of eligible 
voters cast a vote in the referendum. It is important to note that 55 percent of eligible California 
voters participated in the 2012 presidential election, and 59 percent in 2008.143 Thus, a 50 
percent participation requirement would not banish propositions from California politics. It 
would, however, pressure proponents to campaign for initiatives only in presidential election 
years. Consequently, more voters would be deciding the outcomes of initiatives and referendums 
which could have profound effects on the state. 
  
G. Frequency of Initiatives  
 
Yet another solution to the criticism that the constitution of California is amended too 
often is to reduce the frequency with which citizens may initiate a constitutional amendment. 
Similar to the Philippines, California could regulate the initiative process to limit citizen-initiated 
amendments to once every four years. This could have the effect of decreasing the number of 
initiatives and fostering a more deliberative democracy, in that citizens would be required to live 
with their proposed amendments for a longer period of time before voting on them. In addition, if 
initiatives only appeared in presidential elections, the initiative process would benefit from the 
considerably higher levels of voter turnout seen in these elections.144   
 
 
 
                                                 
140 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 33.  
141 Who Voted in Previous Referendums and Elections, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 
http://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/australian_electoral_history/Voter_Turnout.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 
2014).  
142 Several European nations, including Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, and Slovakia, require at least fifty 
percent of all eligible voters to cast ballots in order for any proposition to pass. LUÍS AGUILAR-CONRARIA 
& PEDRO MAGALHÃES, REFERENDUM DESIGN, QUORUM RULES AND TURNOUT 15 (2008), available at 
http://portal.uam.es/portal/page/portal/UAM_ORGANIZATIVO/Departamentos/CienciaPoliticaRelacion
esInternacionales/publicaciones%20en%20red/working_papers/10%20Pedro%20Magalhaes%20WP%20
95_08.pdf.  
143 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 22. 
144 See Voter Turnout, CENTER FOR VOTING & DEMOCRACY, http://www.fairvote.org/research-and-
analysis/voter-turnout/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2014) (indicating that voter turnout in presidential elections is 
usually ten to twenty percent higher than in midterm elections).  
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
There are numerous systems of direct democracy implemented throughout the world. The 
initiative and referendum, as practiced in Switzerland, the Philippines, Kenya, and Australia, 
offer useful comparisons to California’s initiative and referendum system because they encounter 
some of the same problems faced in California. Helpful techniques that are already used abroad, 
such as the double majority requirement, advisory and indirect initiatives, frequency limitations, 
and signature distribution requirements, could be put to constructive use in California. By 
learning how others have approached similar problems, California voters can carry on a more 
informed discussion of how to improve their own system of direct democracy.  
 
 
 
 
